UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

1-22-2009

State v. Ciccone Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
32179

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Ciccone Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 32179" (2009). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2429.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2429

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

,
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

)
)
)
)
)

NO. 32179

)

ALBERT A. CICCONE,

Defe"da"Mppel1,"l

!

. FILED"' COpy
REPLY BRIEf

/_

:;;~;-]

-----------),
I
____________

Supreme Court_collrtoll.ro"a:e· 1
Entere?~~ ATS ~_;_-=:_:~:. _~.-:~.~-'~"'~-

I

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ELMORE

HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL
District Judge

MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843
SARA B. THOMAS
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. # 5867

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

__ LS.aJ#_6247'

__. .___.__. ___.__ ~_. _____._. . ______

3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

A. Contrary To The State's Assertion, Prosecutors Do
Not Have Greater Leeway To Engage In Misconduct
In Closing Arguments Because Of Their
"Improvisational Nature" '" ..... '" ......................... '" ..... '" ........ '" ............ 15
B. The State Is Mischaracterizing The Prosecutor's
Comments On Mr. Ciccone's Silence In An Effort
To Make Them Seem Like Comments On The
Evidence
...................................................................................... 16

1. The Prosecutor Commented On Mr. Ciccone's
Silence When, In Describing An Alleged Altercation
Between Mr. Ciccone And His Wife, He Argued That
"There's Only Two People That Know [What Happened],
And Kathleen Ciccone Isn't Here To Tell Us" ................................ 17

2. The Prosecutor Commented On Mr. Ciccone's Silence
When He Argued That "There Is No Testimony" That
Mr. Ciccone Was Distracted Or Not Looking At His
Wife Immediately Before Striking Her With His Car. .................. '" .19
C. Given The Specialized Application Of The Fundamental
Error Standard To Claims Of Prosecutorial Misconduct
Committed During Closing Arguments, Because The
Misconduct In Commenting On Mr. Ciccone's Silence Is
So Egregious As To Be Fundamental, It Is Also Prejudicial. ............... 20
D. The Prosecutor's Emotional Plea To The Jury Was
Neither A Reiteration Of Defense Counsel's Argument,
Nor A Proper, Measured Response To Defense Counsel's
Argument
......................................................................................22
IV. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing Upon
Mr. Ciccone A Sentence (Fixed Life) Which Is Excessive
Given Any View Of The Facts
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................•.............28
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .............•.................................................................29

.!

ii

Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991) ............................................................ 21

Rules

IAR.(e)(2) ............................................................................................................6

!

iv

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously articulated in
Mr. Ciccone's Appellant's Brief and, therefore, are not repeated herein.
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ARGUMENT
I.

Mr. Ciccone's Notice Of Appeal Is Timely From The Judgment Of Conviction
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ciccone acknowledged that his Notice of Appeal was
filed on August 2, 2005, exactly 42 days after the district court's Amended Judgment
and Commitment was entered. (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) He further acknowledged that,
except for the file stamp and the date above the judge's signature, the Amended
Judgment and Commitment was identical to the district court's original Judgment and
Commitment. 1 (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) Finally, Mr. Ciccone acknowledged that the
general rule in Idaho is that when a notice of appeal is timely only from an amended
judgment of conviction that does not alter any of the terms from which the defendant
appeals, the defendant is not entitled to a direct review of his judgment of conviction
and/or sentence. (Appellant's Brief, p.13.)
Nevertheless, Mr. Ciccone maintains that, under the unique facts of this case, his
August 2, 2005 Notice of Appelil was sufficient to grant this Court jurisdiction to directly
review his judgment of conviction and sentence.

(See Appellant's Brief, pp.13-18.)

Specifically, Mr. Ciccone contends that: (1) because the district court's original
Judgment and Commitment was never given a valid file stamp, it was never properly
entered and, thus, Mr. Ciccone's time to appeal never started to run until entry of the
Amended Judgment of Commitment (Appellant's Brief, pp.14-16); and (2) even if the

1 Because it lacks a proper file stamp, it is Mr. Ciccone's contention that the original
Judgment and Commitment was never "entered." Nevertheless, it is clear that the
district court tried to enter a valid a Judgment and Commitment and, although, without a
valid file stamp, no one can be sure of precisely when the district court tried to do so, it
was almost certainly sometime before entry of the Amended Judgment and
Commitment.
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judgment was actually entered.").)

In making that conclusory assertion though, the

State fails to address and, indeed, seeks to have this Court ignore, the critical question,
raised in Mr. Ciccone's AppeUant's Brief (see Appellant's Brief, pp.14-16), of when a
judgment of conviction is "entered" and, thus, whether (or when) the time for to appeal
began to run. Moreover, the State's attempted gloss of this important issue is illogical.
To the extent that the State thinks that judgment was entered on June 7, 2005, because
that was the day that sentence was orally pronounced, the State's logic fails as a matter
of law. See IAR. 17(e)(2) (providing that "prematurely"-filed notices of appeal "shall
become valid upon the filing and the placing the stamp of the clerk of the court on such
appealable judgment," thereby making it clear that there is no properly-entered,
appealable order until there is a properly-filed written order); State v. Gissel, 105 Idaho
287, 290, 668 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Ct. App. 1983) ("[T]he premature notices of appeal to
the district court matured and validly vested jurisdiction in that court, upon entry of
record of the written judgments of conviction in the magistrate division."). Alternatively,

to the extent the State thinks that judgment was entered on June 7, 2005, because it
assumes that that was the day the district court forwarded it to the clerk's office for filing,
the State's conclusion is nothing more than rank speculation because, without a valid
file stamp, there is no way of knowing for sure when it was forwarded to the clerk's
office for inclusion in the case file. 3

Given the date of the sentencing hearing, the date appearing next to Judge
Wetherell's signature, and the date appearing on the certificate of service,it certainly
seems to be plausible, or even likely, that the original Judgment and Commitment was
forwarded to the clerk's office for filing on June 7,2005. However, without a file stamp,
this belief cannot be confirmed. Nor should it be presumed when, to do so, would to
presume a lack of jurisdiction over a criminal appeal.
3
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II.
Mr. Ciccone's Statutory And Constitutional Rights To A Speedy Trial Were Violated
When The District Court Granted The State's Motion For A Continuance And Pushed
His Trial Back By Almost Six Months
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ciccone argued that his statutory and constitutional
rights to a speedy trial were violated because he was not tried until 446 days (nearly 15
months) after his arrest, and 343 days (nearly a full year) after the State's filing of its
Information. (Appellant's Brief, pp.18-35.) He argued first that, under the standards set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), his
speedy trial rights under both the United States and Idaho Constitutions4 were violated
by the delay in bringing him to trial because the length of the delay was presumptively
prejudicial, the State's reasons for the delay did not justify that delay, Mr. Ciccone timely
asserted his right to a speedy trial, and Mr. Ciccone was prejudiced by the delay in
bringing his case to trial. (Appellant's Brief, pp.19-34.) Next, he argued that his speedy
trial rights under I.C. §§ 19-106 and 19-3501 were violated because, as had been
previously demonstrated, the reasons for the delay in bringing him to trial were
insufficient to justify the delay and, therefore, the State had failed to show "good cause"
for the delay. (Appellant's Brief, pp.34-35.)
In response, the State begins its argument with a discussion of Idaho's speedy
trial statute, asserting that, because certain of the State's witnesses were military
personnel, temporarily assigned to duty outside the State of Idaho, they were
necessarily "unavailable" and that, in the absence of proof that the State caused the

As noted in Mr. Ciccone's Appellant's Brief (pp.19-20& n.7), the Idaho Supreme Court
has adopted the same four-factored test for evaluating speedy trial claims brought
under the Idaho Constitution as was mandated by the United States Supreme Court in
Barker v. Wingo for speedy trial claims raised under the United States Constitution.
4
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vindicated on appeal must result in reversals of convictions.

Finally, contrary to the

State's claim, Mr. Ciccone clearly and unequivocally asserted his right to a speedy trial.
A.

Whether We Are Talking About The Constitutional Or Statutory Right To A
Speedy Trial, The State Is Incorrect When It Claims That A Witness's Temporary
Military Duty Outside The State Is Automatically A Sufficient Reason For
Delaying A Defendant's Trial
Repeatedly citing the same three cases-Belf v. State, 651 S.E.2d 218, (Ga. Ct.

App. 2007), Commonwealth v. Hyland, 875 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 2005)), and Kelfey v.

Commonwealth, 439 S.E. 2d 616 (Va. Ct. App. 1994)-the State argues that "the
unavailability of a material witness due to service in the United States armed forces
constitutes sufficient justification for delay" of a defendant's trial. (Respondent's Brief,
pp.15, 18-19.) Implicit in this argument is the assumption that merely being assigned to
temporary military duty out of state necessarily makes one "unavailable" for trial. (See
Respondent's Brief, pp.15-19, 22-23.)
While the State's argument is supported by the three out-of-state cases it relies
upon, none of these cases is particularly persuasive.

In each instance, the court in

question simply assumed (as the district court did below in this case, and as the State
asks this Court to do now), that the temporary out-of-state military assignment of a
witness creates "an unqualified inability" on the part of that witness to attend the
defendant's trial, not just a burden on him.7 See Bell, 287 Ga. App. at 302; Hyland, 875

As was noted in Mr. Ciccone's Appellant's Brief (p.24), as well as the State's
respondent's Brief, pp.14-15), in State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 118 P.3d 160 (Ct. App.
2005), the Idaho Court of Appeals held that, when Barker spoke of a "missing witness"
being a valid reason for the government to delay a criminal defendant's trial, "there is an
enormous difference between [a witness] being inconvenienced and being unavailable.
True unavailability suggests an unqualified inability to attend, while inconvenience
merely implies that attendance at trial would be burdensome." Id. at 837,118 P.3d at
169.
7
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the relevant witnesses. In Chardon, for example, the Kings County Supreme Court in
New York noted that, where the government's witness was a serviceman believed to be
stationed in Korea, but the government had failed to show diligent efforts initially in
obtaining his presence for the defendant's trial (because it never attempted to contact
him directly, it did not attempt to obtain his address, it did not attempt to contact any
other military officials to confirm that his duty station was, in fact, Korea, or to request
that he be permitted to travel to the United States), the government had failed to prove
that the witness was truly unavailable such that the delay owing to the witness's
absence during that period would be weighed against the government. Chardon, 2005
WL 2866923 at *3-6. Just as was the case in the above-referenced portion of Chardon,
here, the State has utterly failed to show that it made diligent efforts to obtain the
attendance of the witnesses in question.
While the State would have this Court believe that the district court found that it
had made "diligent efforts to obtain" the information that would have allowed it to secure
the attendance of the witnesses in question (Respondent's Brief, pp.17-18 (emphasis
added», that claim is patently false. In fact, the citation now relied upon by the State
reveals that the district court found only that "the prosecution in this case did make
efforts to be in touch with the Air Force regarding these witnesses ...." (Tr. Vol. VII,

p.29, Ls.5-7 (emphasis added).) Moreover, the facts could not have supported such a
finding since, as was discussed in some detail in Mr. Ciccone's Appellant's Brief, the
crux of the State's problem in securing the attendance of its witnesses was that it chose
not to independently investigate this case and, instead, hoped to have its case handed
to it on a silver platter by Air Force investigators. (See Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Thus,
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C.

Mr. Ciccone Clearly And Unequivocally Asserted His Right To A Speedy Trial
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ciccone argued that all four of the Barker v. Wingo

factors weigh in his favor. (Appellant's Brief, pp.20-34.) In doing so, he pointed out that
he had timely asserted his right to a speedy trial below.

(Appellant's Brief, p.32.)

However, the State now claims otherwise, arguing as follows:
Although Ciccone asserted his statutory right to a speedy trial at the
July 19, 2004 hearing [on the State's motion for a continuance on the eve
of trial] (7/19/04 Tr., p.19, Ls.13-23), he did not unequivocally assert his
constitutional right to a speedy trial until he filed his motion to dismiss on
December 20,2004 (R. vol. II, pp.168-69; see also Trial Tr., p.41, L.18p.43, L.2.)
(Respondent's Brief, p.23 (emphasis in original).)
The State's present argument is meritless.

Barker says nothing about the

defendant having to explicitly cite the Constitution in order to gain the benefit of its
guarantee of a speedy trial; in discussing the importance of the defendant's assertion of
his right, that opinion focused on whether the defendant expressed a desire to have his
case tried because such a desire is the best evidence of whether he was deprived of a
fair trial through its delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32. In this case, Mr. Ciccone clearly
and unequivocally expressed such a desire. (Tr. Vol. VII, p.19, Ls.17-23, p.22, Ls.2122.)

III.
Mr. Ciccone Is Entitled To A New Trial Because The Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct
By Twice Commenting On Mr. Ciccone's Silence And Once Asking The JUry To Convict
Based On Its Sympathy For The Victim
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ciccone argued that the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct when, during the rebuttal portion of his closing argument, he twice
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the Field Court did no such thing, as that case involved a claim of prosecutorial
misconduct in the questioning of a witness. See Field, 144 at 571-72, 165 P.2d at 28586. Second, and more importantly, the State fails to explain how, if, as it argues in its
brief, "the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial
misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor"
(Respondent's Brief, p.27 (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982»), it
should be entitled to any leeway because the prosecutor's statements were made "on
the fly" and the prosecutor was, therefore, less culpable. In other words, the State's
request defies logic and overlooks the fact that the crux of Mr. Ciccone's prosecutorial
misconduct claim is that he was denied a fair trial by the prosecutorial arguments in
question.
B.

The State Is Mischaracterizing The Prosecutor's Comments On Mr. Ciccone's
Silence In An Effort To Make Them Seem Like Comments On The Evidence
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ciccone argued that the prosecutor engaged in

misconduct by twice asking the jury to draw a negative inference from Mr. Ciccone's
exercise of his Fifth Amendment right not to testify.

He argued that the first such

incident occurred when, in discussing what the State had sought to portray as a
physical altercation between Mr. Ciccone and his wife immediately before she walked
off and was struck and killed by Mr. Ciccone's vehicle, the prosecutor, after suggesting
that Kathleen Ciccone may have thrown her purse at her husband during this
altercation, asserted as follows: "There's only two people that know, and Kathleen
Ciccone isn't here to tell us." (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1853, Ls.3-23; see Appellant's Brief, pp.36,
37-40.) He argued that the second such incident occurred when, while arguing that
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The State responds, however, by arguing that the prosecutor's argument was not
a comment on Mr. Ciccone's decision not to testify and, thus, inform the jury of precisely
what had happened immediately prior to his wife's death, but that it was a comment on
statements Mr. Ciccone made during his interrogation regarding "the state of certain
evidence."

(Respondent's Brief, pp.30-31.) The State further argues that the

prosecutor's argument "centered around Ciccone's actual statements and Kathleen's
inability to refute them, rather than Ciccone's failure to testify .... " (Respondent's Brief,
pp.30-31.)

The State's argument, however, is utterly illogical and represents a

mischaracterization of what was actua/ly argued to the jury.
As was quoted in the State's own brief, the relevant portion of the prosecutor's
argument is as follows:
Let's talk about [defense counsel] talking about the scene on K & R
Ranch Road. How this precious purse a woman would have carried, the
bag of food she obviously had in her possession because that's what
Albert said.
So I guess she has got the purse in the car, the bag of food in the
car, the medicine, the sweater tied around her and everything. And she
decided to get out with a/l of that stuff on K & R Ranch Road . . . and
decided to walk however many feet -- let's just say -- it is on the chart -walk up there with all the purse, sweatshirt tied around her waist, bottle of
pills, and al/ the food bag, and had enough wherewithal to throw it all at
him right- or left-handed. Maybe she let the purse down to get the
McDonalds bag or Burger King to throw at him. Maybe she just left it
there. I don't know. There's only two people that know, and Kathleen
Ciccone isn't here to tell us.
(Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1853, Ls.3-23 (emphasis added); see also Respondent's Brief, p.30.)
The context of the prosecutor's argument makes it clear that he was not talking
about Mr. Ciccone's interrogation, or even about Mr. Ciccone's actual statements.
Rather, it makes it obvious that he was commenting on the state of the physical
evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom and, most importantly, he was
18

"testimony" was merely an "inartful" way of referring to Mr. Ciccone's statements to the
police. (Respondent's Brief, p.33.)
Because the State's disingenuous argument on this issue is belied not only by a
commonsense reading of the plain language of the prosecutor's argument, but also by
the context in which that argument was made, Mr. Ciccone submits that this Court
should completely disregard that argument.

C.

Given The Specialized Application Of The Fundamental Error Standard To
Claims Of Prosecutorial Misconduct Committed During Closing Arguments,
Because The Misconduct In Commenting On Mr. Ciccone's Silence Is So
Egregious As To Be Fundamental, It Is Also Prejudicial
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ciccone argued that the prosecutor's misconduct in

commenting on his silence constitutes fundamental and, thus, prejudicial error.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.40.) In response, the State argues that inquiries into whether an
error is fundamental, and whether that error is prejudicial, are very different and, thus, a
finding of fundamental error does not necessarily inform the question of whether the
error is prejudicial. (Respondent's Brief, pp.33-35.) While the State's argument might
be well-taken in another context, under the facts of this case, it does not have merit.
As noted in Mr. Ciccone's Appellant's Brief, there is a very specific application of
the fundamental error standard for claims of prosecutorial misconduct during closing
arguments: whether "the comments were so egregious and/or inflammatory that any
consequent prejudice could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial court
informing the jury that the comments should be disregarded." (Appellant's Brief, p.41
(Citing State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 561,565,21 P.3d 498,502 (Ct. App. 2001».) Given
this specialized application of the fundamental error standard, if this Court finds that the
prosecutor's comments on Mr. Ciccone's silence can be considered on appeal (as it
20

D.

The Prosecutor's Emotional Plea To The JUry Was Neither A Reiteration Of
Defense Counsel's Argument, Nor A Proper, Measured Response To Defense
Counsel's Argument
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ciccone argued that the prosecutor committed

misconduct when he concluded his closing arguments with the following remarks:
When you kill somebody, you take away everything they have and
everything they ever will have. Kathleen was 22 years old. Her death is a
tragedy. Give her life meaning and give her death the sense of justice that
it requires. Hold the defendant accountable for the purposeful, willful,
deliberate, premeditated actions that he took that night [sic].
(Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1860, Ls.15-22; see Appellant's Brief, pp.42-46.)

Specifically,

Mr. Ciccone argued that these remarks were improper because they were a plea for the
jury to convict Mr. Ciccone based on matters outside the evidence-namely, sympathy
for the deceased. (Appellant's Brief, pp.42-46.)
In response, the State argues that "the prosecutor was merely repeating what
Ciccone himself had already argued," through his counsel, about the deceased's death
being tragic, and that it was a "proper, measured response to Ciccone's argument that
the jury should 'hold [Ciccone] in [their] hands' and only find him guilty of 'accidentally'"
killing his wife and his unborn child. {Respondent's Brief, pp.36-37.} The State also
argues, in the alternative, that even if the prosecutor did something improper, the error
does not rise to the level of fundamental error. (Respondent's Brief, p.37.)
1998), both of which were cited by the State (see Respondent's Brief, pp.34-35), and
discussed by the Court of Appeals in State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 715-16, 685 P.3d
1109, 1114-15 (Ct. App. 2003), also cited by the State (see Respondent's Brief, pp.3435) (interestingly the fourth case cited by the State, State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 561, 21
P.3d 498 (Ct. App. 2001), does not contain any discussion of a harmless error analysis
for claims of prosecutorial misconduct): "Where prosecutorial misconduct is shown, the
test for harmless error is whether the appellate court can conclude, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the result of the trial would not have been different absent the
misconduct." Brown, 131 Idaho at 70, 951 P.2d 1297. However, he contends that this
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result of Mr. Ciccone's reckless driving, not malice, and, therefore, Mr. Ciccone should
not be found guilty of murder; (2) despite the tragedy of this case, the jurors ought to not
to be swayed by sympathy or vindictiveness in reaching their conclusions but, instead,
because of the gravity of their mission, should faithfully follow the law; and (3) the jurors
should not allow themselves to be bullied into finding Mr. Ciccone guilty. (See Tr. Vol.
VIII, p.i847, L.1 - p.i848, L.i3.) Defense counsel most certainly did not urge the jury
to decide this case based on sympathy or a desire to seek "justice," i.e., revenge (in
fact, he argued quite the opposite, which is completely appropriate), and, thus, the
prosecutor had no right to make any such exhortations either.
Moreover, even if defense counsel had said something improper, the State's
remedy would have been to object; improper arguments by defense counsel are not
license for the prosecutor to engage in misconduct in return. Surely, two wrongs do
make a right.
IV.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing Upon Mr. Ciccone A Sentence
(Fixed Life) Which Is Excessive Given Any View OfThe Facts
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ciccone argued that his fixed life sentence is
excessive in light of the overwhelming nature of the mitigating evidence before the
district court, as well as the relatively (for a first degree murder case) non-egregious
circumstances of the offense.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.46-6i.) In response, the State

presents a host of reasons why it believes that Mr. Ciccone's fixed life sentence does
not represent an abuse of the district court's sentencing discretion (Respondent's Brief,
pp.38-45), most of which are unremarkable and, thus, require no further response.
However, a few discreet issues warrant some clarification.

24
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. I

weeks after the incident (at Mr. Ciccone's preliminary hearing) that she could not hear
anything Mr. Ciccone was saying into his cell phone.

(Tr. Vol. II, p.34, Ls.5-9.)

However, at trial, nearly fifteen months later, she claimed that she heard Mr. Ciccone
say, "I got the job done." (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.5i8, Ls.5-i8.) As if this changed testimony is
not suspicious enough, when confronted with inconsistency in her testimony, Ms. Shaw
adamantly (but incorrectly) stated that no one had ever asked her what Mr. Ciccone had
said into his cell phone. (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.520, L.i6 - p.524, L.23.)
Third, the State cites page 3 of the PSI for the proposition that Mr. Ciccone
"made statements that indicated he was feigning his claimed amnesia." (Respondent's
Brief, p.42.) Mr. Ciccone submits, however, that page 3 of the PSI contains no such
information. 1O
Fourth, although the State claims, without citation, that "there was evidence at
the scene that suggested Ciccone had instigated a physical confrontation with" his wife
immediately before striking her with his car (Respondent's Brief, p.44 (emphasis
added)), that allegation is little more than fanciful speculation on the State's part. The
reality is that, at trial, one of the police detectives wanted to testify that, in his non-expert
opinion, scuff marks and supposed cloth pattern transfers in the dirt were consistent
with a physical altercation having occurred. (See Tr. Vol. VIII, p.874, L.9 - p.875, L.25.)
However, not only was his highly speculative opinion precluded (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.874, L.9

Although it is not clear that it is what the State is referring to, there is a reference on
that page of the PSI to the fact that, while he was being questioned at the hospital,
Mr. Ciccone remembered the first name of the lead detective who had spoken to him
previously (but well after the time of the accident). To the extent that the State relies on
this fact for its claim that there were indications that he was feigning amnesia, that
claim, made by counsel for the State, who is presumably neither a human lie detector,
nor a psychologist, appears recklessly ill-informed.
10
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in his Appellant's Brief,
Mr. Ciccone respectfully requests that his conviction and/or sentence be vacated and
either: (a) the case be ordered dismissed with prejudice; (b) the case be remanded for
a new trial; or (c) his sentence be reduced or the case be remanded for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 22 nd day of January, 2009.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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